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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
At the closing of the 2014 G20 Brisbane Summit, the presidency of the 
2016 G20 was awarded to China. This is the first time China will chair 
the world’s ‘premier forum for economic cooperation’. Yet the G20 is just 
one way that China, now the world’s largest economy on purchasing 
power parity terms, may seek to shape global economic governance. 
China is both seeking changes to the ‘traditional’ global economic 
governance model, centred upon the Bretton Woods Institutions, and 
experimenting with new processes such as the BRICS forum and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  
For the moment at least, China will not ‘place all its eggs in one basket’. 
It will likely pursue a combination of pragmatic and opportunistic 
approaches that do not reflect any overarching ‘grand strategy’ toward 
global economic governance. The G20 has the potential to help China 
expand its role in global economic governance while retaining the 
fundamental building blocks of the current governance architecture. 
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At the closing of the 2014 G20 Brisbane Summit, the presidency of the 
2016 G20 was awarded to China. The announcement is timely. The 
IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook estimates that, on a purchasing 
power parity (PPP) basis, China is now the world’s largest economy.1 
The accuracy of this estimate is less interesting than whether or not the 
world has the right governance architecture — the rules and institutions 
that underpin the global economy — to accommodate this shift in 
economic power.  
Given its meteoric ascendancy, China has a growing incentive to pursue 
global economic rules more favourable to the Chinese economy, while 
retaining those aspects of the international system that have facilitated 
China’s prosperity.2 China’s global economic governance preferences 
will help to shape the future distribution of global governance 
responsibilities between the post-war G7-dominated Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) and the more diversified set of emerging twenty-first 
century governance actors.  
The goal of this Analysis is to understand China’s approach to global 
economic governance. It examines China’s relationship with existing 
governance structures and its role in establishing new forums and 
processes, most notably the BRICS, but also new institutions such as 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. We explore the extent to 
which these new initiatives challenge or complement the incumbent 
Bretton Woods-centred system.3 In light of China’s 2016 G20 
presidency, we also look at the incentives for China to utilise the G20 
leaders’ process as a means to increase its role in global governance. 
CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
DECISION-MAKING SPACE 
Three main factors seem to motivate China’s growing participation in 
global economic governance. First, increased representation for China 
(and similarly other emerging and developing countries) can be seen as 
a logical end in itself. The current governance structures, particularly in 
the BWIs, are no longer appropriate when compared to the actual 
distribution of global economic weight in the twenty-first century.4 An 
adjustment of these governance arrangements would at least yield a 
system that more closely mirrors modern economic reality.  
Second, there is an implicit opportunism underlying China’s behaviour: 
more representation and influence means a greater ability to modulate 
any future developments in global economic governance that may 
threaten to undermine China’s interests. Even if China does nothing with 
its improved representation in the forums of global economic 
governance, it would still prefer to have that increased representation in 
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the face of future ‘unknown unknowns’. Nevertheless, as this Analysis 
will show, there is little evidence to support theories predicting that China 
has a plan for the BWIs as part of a ‘grand strategy’ to reorganise the 
global economic governance system.5 This is based on a general 
recognition in China that the country has benefited, and continues to 
benefit, from the current architecture.6  
Third, greater representation aligns with China’s desire to demonstrate 
its ‘good intentions’ as a responsible stakeholder.7 China wants to 
convince other countries that its economic and political rise will be 
peaceful, and that it is serious in its self-proclaimed commitment to be an 
advocate for developing countries. Chinese analysts still point to a 
‘learning by doing’ mindset with a view to further improving the country’s 
capacities in economic diplomacy and governance.8 
There is no straightforward answer as to how China might navigate the 
evolving global economic governance system. China has three main 
options: it could increase its involvement with the ‘traditional’ governance 
actors, in particular the BWIs; it could place more emphasis on 
governance actors that do not feature the G7 as founding or dominant 
members, chiefly BRICS-like processes; or it could revert to a pattern of 
non-participation or indifference. Because of its high level of 
interdependence with the global economy, this last option is the least 
likely course that China will pursue and for that reason this paper does 
not explore it in any detail. 
These three options are not really stark alternatives. There is no real 
incentive for China, much the same as for any other important player, to 
put all its eggs in one basket. It is very likely to choose a combination of 
approaches. Indeed, the line between the family of BWIs and newer 
China-instigated processes is blurred, with increasingly complex 
interactions occurring between the two, spurred by the increasing 
maturity of the Chinese processes.  
Since the 1970s, China’s focus has been on the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. China has developed deep links with these ‘traditional’ 
governance actors, varying in nature between the respective 
institutions.9 The World Bank’s development-financing role has certainly 
generated less tension in China than the IMF’s politically fraught 
exchange rate surveillance of the renminbi, for example. Yet China has 
remained engaged in active dialogue with both processes, 
disagreements notwithstanding.10  
Recent sentiment in China seems to point to an increasingly proactive 
approach to global governance that is less beholden to the status quo.11 
In particular, China has developed closer links with a set of ‘emerging’ 
governance actors, and has, in some cases, been instrumental in their 
inception.12 In this section, we will analyse China’s evolving relationship 
with the key organisations of the traditional and emerging governance 
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actors, particularly the BWIs and the BRICS, and what this may imply for 
the future configuration of the global economic governance system.  
CHINA AND THE BWIS  
Over the last three decades, China has become an active member of the 
BWIs and has often utilised their services. Indeed, even though China 
has not always agreed with the IMF’s assessments, the country has 
benefited significantly from IMF technical assistance (although it has 
never borrowed significantly from the IMF).13 China also continues to be 
a major recipient of loans from the World Bank.14 Having graduated from 
the World Bank’s financing program for the world’s poorest countries, the 
International Development Association (IDA), 15 years ago,15 China was 
the third-largest recipient of new commitments made by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World Bank’s 
main non-concessional lending arm, and the fourth-largest beneficiary of 
commitments from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) in FY2013.16 China has also received significant technical 
assistance from the World Bank since its admission as a member.17  
While this section focuses mostly on the IMF and World Bank, it is worth 
briefly saying something about the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
China’s admission to the WTO in 2001 was a milestone in the country’s 
quest for closer integration into the existing global economic governance 
system. Between 1995 and 2013, China’s share of global merchandise 
exports increased from 2.9 to 12.1 per cent, equating to a nominal 
increase of around $148.8 billion to $2.2 trillion.18 Given the role 
international trade has played in China’s growth, China has a strong 
interest in a functioning and efficient world trade regime.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that China’s primary incentive 
is to take a proactive and leading role in revitalising multilateralism under 
the auspices of the WTO. China has also pursued more pragmatic 
solutions such as bilateral and regional preferential trading agreements 
(PTAs), like the Regional Closer Economic Partnership (RCEP — a 
trading agreement for the ASEAN plus 6 countries, namely the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nation countries and Australia, China, 
India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand). 
One of the reasons for China’s pursuit of its own PTAs is the fact that it 
is the only top five economy that is not currently part of at least one of 
the two major US-driven plurilateral PTAs: the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
There seems to be a strong consensus in China that the standards 
contained within the TPP are unacceptably high relative to the country’s 
current economic development stage and administrative capacity.19 
Moreover, it is seen as a process led by advanced economy interests, 
chiefly those of the United States and Japan, which discriminates 
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against emerging market and developing country economies such as 
China.20  
Nevertheless, even if China remains outside the TPP in the short term, 
such indirect regulatory pressure could be a potential catalyst for further 
domestic reform, similar to what occurred in the case of China’s WTO 
accession.21 Cognisant of the risk that processes such as the TPP may 
make the WTO less relevant, China is aware of the need to ensure it is 
part of any future endeavours to revise the world trade regime.22 This 
has been a motivating factor in China’s pursuit of a ‘Free Trade Area of 
the Asia Pacific’ (FTAAP), a more inclusive alternative to the TPP, which 
would involve all APEC economies, and would allow China to play a 
much more central role in trade rule-setting. While the FTAAP concept 
has made little progress since it was first proposed in 2006, China 
worked hard as chair of APEC 2014 to convince APEC leaders to 
endorse the ‘Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization 
of the FTAAP’.  
Historically, China’s engagement with the ‘traditional’ governance actors 
has reflected a ‘low-profile’ approach — a pervasive principle since the 
premiership of Deng Xiaoping — and an avoidance of outright 
international leadership responsibility.23 Even as the 2008 global 
financial crisis revealed fundamental weaknesses within the Western-led 
global economic governance model, China did not assume an 
essentially more assertive stance.24 It appears that China sees at least 
short- to medium-term value in upholding the core tenets of the BWI 
system. This is hardly surprising, as China has benefited from the 
existing system in the past and it aligns well with China’s traditional 
preference for formalism and predictability.25  
Nevertheless, the Chinese government has also pursued BWI reform.26 
BWI governance reform is regarded as a crucial component of re-
establishing trust between developing economies and the BWIs.27 This 
is especially true for the IMF, where the reputational damage it suffered 
in Asia due to its handling of the Asian financial crisis still lingers on in 
the minds of policy-makers in the region.28 These concerns also seem to 
motivate the assessment by some scholars that the G20 remains too 
dependent on the IMF for technical analysis.29 
While China openly and strongly supports increasing the representation 
of emerging market and developing countries in global economic 
governance structures, it is keenly aware of its capacity to play a larger 
role in these structures and the added responsibilities entailed in 
assuming a greater leadership role.30 The result is an approach that 
seeks incremental change. This view was summarised by a Chinese 
policy analyst as follows: 
China recognises the fact that the reform of the existing 
institutions in terms of voice and representation is a long 
process. There is no simple recipe for this. Still, China has to 
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enlarge its own role in international affairs: if China can play a 
more active and constructive role in international affairs, that will 
make this process easier and easier. 31 
Chinese policy analysts interviewed by the authors stressed the 
importance of ensuring that the process worked on a quid pro quo basis, 
so that China was seen to be both meaningfully contributing to as well as 
benefiting from global economic governance.32 Whether China has 
actually achieved an appropriate balance between responsibility for and 
return from participation in these governance structures is a point of 
contention.33 
The 2008 financial crisis provided momentum for accelerating BWI 
governance reform. Specifically, it produced a modest improvement in 
the representation of emerging market and developing countries in the 
World Bank and the IMF. In line with commitments made at the 
Pittsburgh G20 Summit in 2009, both organisations agreed to an 
increase of about 3 per cent to the voting power for developing and 
transition countries.34 The continued refusal of the US Congress to ratify 
the proposed changes to its governance structure has become a major 
obstacle to the implementation of these commitments. But even though 
these reforms, if implemented, would elevate China to the status of third-
largest member by voting share in both the IMF (6.071 per cent of voting 
shares) and the IBRD (5.55 per cent of voting power), the BWI 
governance structures continue to reflect the post-war economic world 
order more than the economic realities of the twenty-first century.35 Our 
consultations in China suggest that there is an expectation that the BWIs 
will eventually deliver on their promise that these quota reforms are only 
the first steps in a long-term plan for reform. However, for the time being, 
the political impasse over IMF reforms makes the political feasibility of 
any further quota reform an uncertain proposition. 
One way that China is increasing its representation in global economic 
governance structures is through the appointment of professional staff. 
Because this is not subject to quotas and the political process 
associated with altering them, it may be the most obvious avenue of 
promoting inclusivity. China has recently had a few successes in this 
area. In particular, Zhu Min was appointed as the IMF’s deputy 
managing director in 2011 — the highest ever position for a Chinese 
national. However, at the same time, China has only recently attained a 
representation among IMF staff that is similar to its current quota (3.7 per 
cent in 2013 — a substantial increase from only 1.9 per cent in 2007) 
and only 1.5 per cent of all IMF senior (B-level) staff are Chinese 
nationals.36 
European and American claims to the primary leadership positions in the 
IMF and World Bank also compound Chinese frustration. In 2009, 
China’s then-Finance Minister Xie Xuren argued that the “selection 
process … should be open, transparent and merit-based.”37 That said, 
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the BRICS countries did themselves no favours by failing to unite around 
a single candidate in the most recent elections for the heads of the IMF 
and the World Bank.38 However, two other major multilateral 
organisations have elected heads from emerging markets in recent 
times: UNIDO (China: Li Yong, who is the first Chinese national to head 
a UN agency) and the WTO (Brazil: Roberto Azevêdo).39  
CHINA AND THE BRICS 
Based on our consultations in China, it seems clear that there are no 
illusions about the long-term and uncertain nature of any further reform 
process being achieved within the BWIs. Yet we also found that Chinese 
scholars have well-developed ideas about a ‘Plan B’ beyond IMF reform, 
revolving around increasing China’s political influence in other forums. 
Despite China’s clear commitment to strengthening the role of the BWIs, 
China is now actively and openly encouraging the development of 
emerging governance actors and processes, with a view to widening its 
options for participating in global economic governance.  
The archetype of these new actors is the BRICS. The BRIC acronym 
was coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 to 
describe a set of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) with particularly 
promising economic futures. The concept gained momentum and an 
unexpected political currency within the designated countries with the 
BRIC leaders holding their first formal summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009. 
A year later, South Africa received an invitation to come on board as the 
capital S in BRICS, reflecting the “BRICS’ ambition to represent the 
‘global South’.”40 Since the BRICS’ inception, members have pushed to 
institutionalise the process, with annual Leaders’ summits, ministerial 
meetings, and more recently, a BRICS development bank. 
The BRICS process is one of the few global governance initiatives to 
have received the explicit support of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). In the report of the 18th CPC party congress in 2012, the United 
Nations, the G20, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) are the only multilateral bodies referred to as a part 
of China’s effort to play “an active role in international affairs.”41 China 
analyst Yun Sun argues that “the unprecedented level of emphasis the 
new Chinese leader is attaching to the BRICS nations reflects the 
profound changes in China’s perceptions of itself and the outside 
world.”42  
However, the diversity and ad hoc nature of the BRICS group continues 
to raise doubts about its political longevity. O’Neill himself has noted: “I 
never dreamed they would get together as a political group.”43 Indeed, 
apart from their relative underrepresentation in relevant institutions, there 
does not seem to be an obvious political or economic argument that 
would lend itself as a unifying global governance objective for the 
BRICS.44 Even though, politically, there is a convergence within the 
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BRICS over “the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference 
in domestic affairs,” their political and ideological differences are 
significant.45  
At the same time, aggregate economic interdependence among member 
countries as a proportion of their global interdependence remains 
relatively low. Despite impressive growth in recent years, the absolute 
figures for intra-BRICS trade broadly range between 10 and 20 per cent 
of each member’s global total (somewhat lower for exports).46 Trade with 
China equals roughly 5 to 15 per cent of trade with the rest of the world 
for BRICS countries.47 That makes China a more important trading 
partner for the other BRICS members than the United States, but it still 
lags behind the EU. From China’s perspective, exports to the rest of 
BRICS are less than half of those sent to the EU or the United States.48 
China’s most important trading partners will continue to be Western 
countries for some time to come.    
China’s economic size relative to other members also poses a potential 
problem for the BRICS. China’s GDP is larger than the other four 
member economies combined, constituting around 55 per cent of total 
BRICS GDP.49 It also responsible for the vast majority of intra-BRICS 
trade accounting for around 50 to 85 per cent of exports to and 70 to 90 
per cent of imports from the other BRICS economies.50 In order to 
maintain harmonious relations within the BRICS, China will need to 
actively and continually reassure fellow participants of its commitment to 
equality within the forum.   
All of these factors are hurdles to the BRICS becoming a strategic and 
proactive voice in the international arena. Three years after the forum’s 
creation, Time magazine’s Michael Schuman pointedly decried the 
BRICS summits as “real snoozers, producing statements of such vague 
blandness that they make G20 resolutions read like Harry Potter page-
turners.”51 Critics argue that the forum’s agenda is still largely ‘negative’, 
in the sense that it is predominately a kind of protest against the BWI 
status quo and has “not yet translated into a common ‘positive’ 
agenda.”52 These concerns seem to resonate with the Chinese scholars 
we interviewed, who expressed scepticism about whether the BRICS 
could make a substantive contribution to global economic governance in 
the near future.53 
Yet given China’s massive currency reserves already allow for unilateral 
development financing, it is telling that China has actively pursued the 
establishment of a $100 billion ‘New Development Bank’ (NDB) under 
the BRICS authority, as well as a new contingent reserve arrangement 
(similar to the Chiang Mai initiative). The NDB announcement shows 
China is prepared to push for the BRICS evolution as a practically 
focused process.54 The equal division between BRICS members in 
terms of their equity stakes in the NDB pointedly contrasts with the 
proportional World Bank and IMF governance structures outlined earlier. 
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How sustainable the NDB’s ‘equitable’ financing arrangements are in the 
long term remains to be seen; South Africa evidently will struggle to 
provide the same kind of long-term financial backing as China. 
The newly proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) further 
reflects China’s desire to experiment with alternative development 
financing actors, free from the capital-share limits it faces in either the 
World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). With an initial capital 
base of $54 billion and 21 founding members from Asia, the AIIB will 
enhance China’s ability to work with fellow AIIB participants in financing 
Asian infrastructure projects. However, as the AIIB’s Articles of 
Agreement are yet to be drafted, regional US allies South Korea and 
Australia have taken a ‘wait and see’ approach before accepting 
invitations to join the initiative, ostensibly due to their uncertainty the AIIB 
will have “the sorts of governance and transparency” of the traditional 
multilateral institutions.55 While China may rightly regard the call for the 
AIIB to live up to the ‘governance’ structures of the World Bank as 
somewhat hypocritical, China’s probable financial dominance over the 
AIIB’s capital base does raise questions about the relative influence 
other participants will have over the proposed bank’s activities.  
Yet in our interviews, these new multilateral banks — the NDB, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the SCO bank — were not seen 
as an alternative to the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, 
but as an opportunity to learn about “how to play a more positive role by 
setting the agenda and … be involved in the organisation of a new 
international institution” and a way to demonstrate that “China really has 
the intention to become a responsible stakeholder.”56 Nevertheless, the 
BRICS and AIIB were regarded as valid ‘hedging options’ to the BWI 
(and BWI-linked) institutions that are yet to recognise China’s new-found 
financial power.57 While Chinese experts saw “no need to abandon” 
existing forums such as the BWIs, they did note that “there will be some 
room for arbitrage” between traditional and emerging governance 
actors.58 
THE G20: WHAT’S IN IT FOR CHINA? 
One international forum that could potentially be a key instrument of 
China’s efforts to play a bigger role in global economic governance is the 
G20. The G20 was established to push for greater inclusion of emerging 
economies within the existing global economic governance architecture, 
rather than requiring a major overhaul of the post-war system.59 It is no 
longer a viable proposition that the G7 or OECD economies maintain 
primacy in the design and management of economic rules absent of 
Chinese input. The fact that the G20 is the first leaders’ forum to 
accommodate the G7 powers and China on an ‘equal say’ principle is 
thus a significant milestone in the transition away from the G7-
dominated, post-war economic governance model.60  
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For a number of reasons the G20 provides China with opportunities to 
shape global economic governance that are not provided by legacy 
processes. First, it helps that China is an original member of the G20, 
with an involvement stretching back to the forum’s establishment as a 
finance ministers and central bank governors’ process in 1999. China’s 
equal ‘historical ownership’ over the process is politically and 
symbolically important for Chinese participants, especially in comparison 
with other processes where China’s involvement has been an 
afterthought, such as the short-lived G8+5 meetings where the Chinese 
president, alongside the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico, and South 
Africa, would be allowed to briefly join the G8 leaders for a two-hour 
breakfast, and then be asked to leave before the ‘real’ discussions 
resumed.61  
Second, as opposed to the ‘G8+5’ or a ‘G7+China’ model, the G20 is, by 
and large, composed of economies selected on the primary criterion of 
‘size’. Because the other emerging economies within the G20 are also 
foundational members, engaging with the G20 process does not weaken 
China’s claim to the category of — and its self-perception as — a 
‘developing economy’.62 As Marcos Troyjo from the BRICLab forum has 
noted: 
China wants to go on being taken, especially among its Asian 
neighbours and in Africa and Latin America, as one of them, as 
a power from the south, a developing nation … [The new BRICS 
development bank] gives China a sort of still-emerging nation 
status when it reality it is a major economic superpower.63  
The G20 is thus useful for China in that it affords it a space at the ‘top 
table’, without noticeably affecting China’s claims to the special 
allowances awarded to developing countries within the prevailing rules of 
the global economy. As a counterfactual, a ‘G7 + China’ model would 
have been more likely to undermine China’s insistence that it may be 
eligible for ‘differentiated’ (meaning fewer) responsibilities than the G7 
members in bodies such as the WTO or the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change negotiations, among others.   
Third, the G20 affords China a pre-eminent yet informal space where it 
can regularly engage with other G20 members as it ‘grows into’ a more 
significant leadership role in the global economy. Although China has so 
far demonstrated a preparedness to rise from ‘within’ the present 
multilateral system, its foundational role in the AIIB and in the 
establishment of the NDB point to a willingness to experiment with 
alternatives to the BWIs. A particular challenge for China therefore is to 
determine how best to move away from the ‘low international profile’ 
advocated by Deng Xiaoping to a more activist approach, while 
preserving a global governance system that has largely served China 
well for the past three decades.  
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Given that Chinese officials are very aware of the international concern 
surrounding China’s rise, and whether it will truly be a peaceful one, the 
‘elasticity’ of the G20 process provides a ‘widening’ of the multilateral 
space in which China can build trust with the major economies.64 
Although some Chinese officials have declared their support for a 
permanent G20 secretariat,65 there is at the least a general view that the 
usefulness of G20, like the BRICS, is primarily derived from its ability to 
progress dialogue on global economic governance in a manner that is 
intended to strengthen, rather than undermine, the BWIs.66  
Fourth, the G20 provides an important avenue for negotiation on global 
economic governance matters between China and the United States. 
With a combined responsibility for approximately one-third of global 
wealth,67 the direction that the China-US relationship takes in the early 
twenty-first century will shape the future of the global economy. Yet the 
challenge facing the ‘G2 within the G20’ is both acute and exceptional: 
the international community has not had to accommodate the 
geopolitical consequences of a hegemon’s demotion to ‘second biggest 
economy’ since the United States surpassed Great Britain’s GDP in 
1872.68 How willing the United States and other major powers are to 
facilitate a greater global economic governance role for China is a matter 
of debate.69 Given China’s recent (probable) overtaking of the United 
States as the world’s largest economy (by PPP)70 it follows that the 
degree to which the ‘G2’ is able to constructively engage with one 
another through key global economic forums like the G20 will help define 
the “global bounds of the possible.”71  
The agenda-setting ability of the ‘G2’ was recently highlighted at the 
conclusion of the APEC 2014 meeting, where a China-US agreement on 
carbon emissions gave a much needed boost to global climate change 
negotiations. This is a major reversal from the fractious breakdown of 
negotiations at the 2009 UNFCCC COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen, 
where disagreement between China and the United States over whether 
China should have equal or lower emissions reductions targets than the 
United States effectively scuttled any prospects of an agreement. In 
contrast to Copenhagen, the momentum engendered by the G2’s 
announcement at APEC 2014 flowed through to the G20 Brisbane 
Summit held a few days later, where all G20 members committed to the 
successful adoption of a successor to the Kyoto protocol at the 
UNFCCC COP-21 meeting in Paris in 2015, and to mobilise financing for 
the Green Climate Fund.72 
While it is true that the G20 is consensus-based and all members 
technically have an equal say, the sheer economic weight of China and 
the United States effectively renders these two economies ‘more equal 
than others’. Nothing will occur in the G20 without Chinese and 
American support. In this regard, the G20 can help to ‘lower the 
pressure’ on controversial ‘G2’ topics by embedding them, over time, 
within a broader multilateral context. For example, the G20 provides an 
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additional forum for debating contentious US-China issues, such as the 
role played by each other’s fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies 
in the perceived causes and effects of ‘global imbalances’.73 In response 
to critics of the G20’s progress in dealing with currency matters, former 
Australian Sherpa, Gordon de Brouwer, notes: 
to say that [appreciating the RMB] is the test of whether [the 
G20] works or not is voodoo economics ... it has no sound 
theoretical or operational analytic basis ... what you need is a 
programme where the policies are clear ... accountable and 
transparent and that’s what our conversations [on this issue] are 
about.74 
Whatever the differences between China and the United States over the 
value of the Chinese renminbi and America’s quantitative easing 
program, it is surely better for officials from these two powers to have a 
wider variety of forums for advancing dialogue, not fewer.  
CHINA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
The announcement at the end of Australia’s 2014 G20 presidency that 
China will chair the forum in 2016 provides China with an immediate 
opportunity to focus and push for progress on a few key policy 
priorities.75 The successful management of its first ever leaders-level 
G20 presidency should help to bolster China’s global reputation. The 
presidency also presents an opportunity to promote complementarity 
between China’s foreign and domestic political-economy concerns. 
However, China will need to manage expectations about what its 
presidency can, and cannot, achieve. 
A WELL-MANAGED G20 
As 2016 is the first year in which China will have custodianship over a 
‘G-x’ leaders’ process, China has a strong incentive to demonstrate its 
capacity as a ‘safe pair of hands’ when it comes to managing ‘the 
premier forum for economic cooperation’ between the major 
economies.76 This also holds true for Xi Jinping and the present senior 
Chinese leadership, as the ‘bucket system’ by which G20 presidencies 
are selected would preclude another Chinese presidency until at least 
2032.77  
As for every G20 president, the challenge is to take up and advance 
core agenda items from the previous presidency while simultaneously 
strengthening the overall G20 process. Recent presidencies have not 
always met this objective. As a number of our senior Chinese 
interviewees lamented the decline in G20 ‘solidarity’ post-2009, there is 
reason to believe that China may exceed some of the previous hosts in 
its attempts to coordinate an agenda that ‘value-adds’ to the G20.78 
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However, putting together a focused and well-managed G20 agenda is 
not only important for the G20 but also for China’s reputation and legacy 
as president. Leaders have a much greater incentive to attend a summit 
that is likely to produce substantive outcomes. For China, full attendance 
at the leaders’ summit, not least by the G7 leaders and especially the US 
president, is critical to China’s global reputation. While this is a concern 
felt by every G20 chair, it was a point made on multiple occasions 
throughout our consultations in China.79 Granted, there is an enhanced 
incentive to take a Chinese G20 presidency seriously due to the sheer 
size of China’s economic weight but this does not guarantee the 
attendance of all G20 leaders to the summit itself. For example, concern 
was expressed to us by advisers who were involved in preliminary 
discussions about the 2016 Chinese G20 presidency that the proximity 
of the 2016 summit to the next US presidential election will either see the 
participation of a ‘lame-duck’ president, without much of a mandate to 
effect change in the United States, or worse — no US president at all.  
Chinese officials are keen to avoid a repeat of Barack Obama’s last-
minute withdrawal from the 2013 APEC summit, caused by political 
gridlock in the US Congress.80 A view often raised in our interviews was 
that in order to minimise the risk of non-attendance at the summit, and 
non-engagement with its presidential year in general, China will look to 
build upon its recent summitry experience, particularly as host of APEC 
2014, and focus on a few core areas where G20 members can add 
value to the global economic governance system.81 Other G20 
members, in particular the G7, have an interest in the success of a 
Chinese G20 presidency, in as much as it may encourage China’s 
leadership to assume more responsibility for the G20’s vitality and, by 
extension, for global economic governance in general.82  
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICY 
There is also an opportunity for the Chinese leadership to utilise its G20 
presidency to promote its own domestic program of economic reform. 
The Chinese G20 presidency will occur within the first year of the 13th 
Five Year plan (2016-2021). While the G20’s long-term agenda and 
China’s G20 presidency will have little influence over the content of the 
13th plan, there will be an opportunity to use the 2016 presidency to 
strengthen the plan’s credibility and to garner international awareness — 
if not support — for it.  
The opportunity to use the G20 to leverage support for an enhanced role 
for China as a global ‘rule-maker’, with both foreign and domestic 
audiences, was mentioned repeatedly throughout our interviews. 
Already the new Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping has 
demonstrated a willingness to engage more actively in economic 
diplomacy.83 Gao Hucheng, the Chinese Minister of Commerce, writes of 
the need to pursue economic diplomacy at “the higher level” to help 
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provide the “favourable external conditions” that will facilitate Xi Jinping’s 
‘Chinese dream’.84 
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS 
A big part of whether a Chinese G20 presidency is ultimately deemed 
successful will depend upon how well domestic and international 
expectations are managed both prior to and during its presidential year. 
As with every G20 presidency, there is a risk of pursuing politically 
ambitious outcomes at the expense of focused and realistic goals, only 
to end up with a presidential legacy of little substance. Yet the fact that 
China’s leadership is less beholden to short-term political agendas 
arguably decreases the incentive for political ‘grandstanding’ on behalf of 
its leaders when more pragmatic approaches are available.  
Nevertheless, pushing for a greater Chinese role in global economic 
governance, while simultaneously keeping domestic and international 
expectations about its capacity to manage the G20 in check, will be no 
mean feat. China will likely draw heavily upon the experience of the two 
preceding G20 chairs, Australia and Turkey, and will need to work 
closely alongside both countries as members of the G20 planning troika 
(which brings together past, present and future hosts for the purposes of 
promoting continuity in the G20 agenda) through 2015 and 2016 
respectively. All in all, the Chinese leadership will have to maintain a 
pragmatic focus and carefully manage any expectations that a Chinese 
G20 presidency will be a ‘game changer’ in terms of China’s role in 
global economic governance. This is particularly important if China 
intends to avoid undermining its self-designation as the leading voice of 
developing countries.  
At the same time, much like its hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics, 
the G20 Summit will attract significant additional interest and scrutiny of 
Chinese affairs from global civil society. This will be a matter of concern 
for the CPC. China will want to avoid its presidency being remembered 
as a year-long critique of its social, political, and economic record. 
CONCLUSION 
China has a growing incentive to pursue global economic rules more 
favourable to the Chinese economy. This will in turn help to shape the 
design of both existing and emerging global economic governance 
structures. But as this Analysis has underlined, we should not expect 
any dramatic break by China with existing institutions and processes, nor 
any immediate effort to supplant them with new governance structures.  
In the last two decades, China has taken a pragmatic approach towards 
dealing with the Bretton Woods system. This pragmatism is also 
reflected in China’s approach to pushing for a reform of BWI 
governance. But the BWIs are no longer the only players in global 
economic governance. Despite the modest contribution of the BRICS 
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process, the group is emblematic of the potential shift that a China-led 
process aimed at diversifying global economic governance may entail. 
China’s indispensable role in the global economy means that its support 
is critical to both the continued relevance of the BWIs and the future of 
initiatives like the BRICS, and thus the overall design of the system. 
The G20 provides China with something of a neat halfway house 
between legacy Bretton Woods structures and new forums like the 
BRICS. The G20 has the potential to help China expand its role in global 
economic governance while retaining the fundamental building blocks of 
the current architecture. This could help to re-energise global economic 
governance. 
At this stage there is little evidence to suggest that China’s push for 
greater representation in global economic governance is part of a long-
term plan to openly challenge the status quo. China’s stance during the 
global financial crisis underlined its preference for incrementalism and 
pragmatism — two other elements deeply engrained in the Chinese 
understanding of global governance.85 China’s pursuit of a greater role in 
global economic governance is pragmatic, opportunistic and self-
interested. These basic principles are likely to continue shaping China’s 
engagement with the governance architecture.  
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